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This factsheet gives answers on how climate exacerbates root causes of conflict in Mali, using a two-
stage econometric approach. The findings show that food insecurity is the mechanism through 
which climate change influences conflict. Climate change indirectly exacerbates conflict by adversely 
affecting agricultural production and food security.
Daniel Kangogo, Peter Läderach and Grazia Pacillo 
2 Climate Security Observatory Series : Impact Pathways KENYA
This publication is part of a factsheet series reporting on the findings of the CGIAR FOCUS Climate 
Security Observatory work in Africa (Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe). 
The research is centered around 5 questions*:  
How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict? 
Impact pathways 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Econometric analysis 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Scopus analysis** 
Where are the climate insecurities hotspots? 
Spatial analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, 
and socio-economic system? 
Network analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Are climate and security policies coherent and integrated? 
Policy coherence analysis
Are policy makers aware of the climate security nexus?
Social media analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Click on the links above to view the other Factsheets 
* Questions 1, 2, 3, 5 are analyzed at country level through a Climate Risk Lens (impact pathways, economic, spatial, network and social 
media analyses). The policy coherence and scopus analyses are at continental level.
**Scopus is one of the largest curated abstract and citation databases, with a wide global and regional coverage of scientific journals, 
conference proceedings, and books. We used Scopus data for analyzing: (1) how global climate research addresses the dynamics 
between climate, socio-economic factors, and conflict, and (2) how the countries studied are represented in the database. 
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1. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report identifies climate change as 
one of the main challenges threatening human existence (IPCC 2021). Together with other drivers, 
climate change threatens human life in many ways including increasing the occurrence of natural 
disasters, undermining livelihoods security and peace. With respect to livelihoods security and peace, 
an increasing stream of research over the past decades has addressed the climate-conflict nexus 
(Burke et al. 2009; Fjelde 2015; Froese and Schilling 2019; Helman et al. 2020). The findings of these 
studies are mixed, some support the argument that climate change exacerbates conflict (Burke et 
al. 2009; Crost et al. 2018; van Weezel 2020) while others find no effect of climate change on conflict 
(Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Slettebak 2012). The studies that support the argument that climate change 
increases conflict conclude that there is no simple and direct causal relationship, rather, the relationship 
between climate change and conflict is indirect, complex and dynamic with feedback loops. For 
instance, in Africa where a majority of the countries rely on agriculture for economic development and 
the main livelihood source for the majority of their households, an increase in climatic anomalies may 
result in reduced production leading to livelihood and food insecurities and this may in turn trigger 
emergence of conflict events (Couttenier and Soubeyran 2014). Similarly, reduction in food production 
due to climatic anomalies may lead to reducing employment opportunities and incomes, and rising 
food prices which may substantially increase conflicts (Fjelde 2015).
This research contributes to the growing debate about climate-conflict nexus by focusing on the 
question of whether climate is a threat multiplier using nationally representative data from Mali a 
country in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa. The objective is to understand the role of climate 
change on conflict occurrence and the pathways through which this happens. We argue that climate 
anomalies negatively affect agricultural production which in turn negatively affects household food 
security and this triggers conflict occurrence. From the foregoing, we answer the following research 
questions:
1. Does climate influence agricultural production?
2. Does agricultural production, as affected by climate, influence household food security?
3. Does food insecurity, as exacerbated by climate impacts, affect the likelihood and intensity of 
conflict?
The next sections of the factsheet proceed as follows. Section 2 outlines the data and methods used; 
section 3 presents a summary of results. The final section provides the conclusion and suggestions 
for future research. 
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2. METHODS AND DATA 
The analysis in this study is based on rich nationally representative household data from Mali which 
is administered by the Living Standards Measurement Study–Integrated Surveys on Agriculture 
(LSMS-ISA) of the World Bank. We use the pooled data of the two waves of Mali LSMS-ISA (2014/15 
and 2017/18). The LSMS-ISA surveys collect detailed data on household characteristics, agricultural 
production, food security, shocks and household assets among others. 
Agricultural production is derived from the agricultural production section and by the sum of 
harvested crops (kgs) in the two waves. Food security measures are taken from the food security 
section, two variables that were measured consistently in the two waves are used, (a) whether or not 
a household member skipped meals because of lack of resources to buy food, and (b) whether or not 
a household member reduced the quantities of food consumed because of lack of resources to buy 
food. The conflict variables were derived from the shocks section, two variables are used whether or 
not a household was faced with (a) violence or insecurity and (b) theft. 
The climate data used come from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station 
data (CHIRPS) which contains information on maximum and minimum temperature and rainfall. 
We calculated both temperature and rainfall anomalies by taking into account the lagged values 12 
months before the month of the survey. To calculate the climate anomalies, we applied the formula 
by Maystadt and Ecker (2014).
In the econometrics estimation, we conduct the analysis in three steps. First, we test whether 
climate anomalies affect total agricultural production controlling for the identified set of covariates. 
We employ a log-linear regression (OLS) to unravel this relationship. Second, we test the effect of 
agricultural production including its interaction with climate anomalies on food security measured 
by (a) skipping of meals and, (b) reducing the quantities of food consumed due to lack of resources to 
buy food. We employ Probit models to test these relationships.
3. RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical models. The 
choice of the variables is guided by economic theory and previous literature. Between 11% and 16% 
of the households of the sample are food insecure, as measured by whether households had to skip 
meals or reduce food quantities, respectively. About 15% of the sampled households have experienced 
a form of conflict while about 6% have experienced theft  (Table 1). Most households are headed by a 
married man with low level of education (Table 2).
To unpack the relationship between climate, socio-economic insecurities and conflict, we first conduct 
a one-to-one correlation analysis between food security, agricultural production, climate anomalies 
and conflict. Table 3 presents the correlation results. 
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Food security Full sample
 Variable Variable description  Obs* Mean  SD  Min  Max
Skip meals Skipped Meals (1=skipped;  
0 otherwise)
7382 0.11 0.312 0 1
Reduced food quantities Reduced the quantity of food 
consumed (1=reduced; 0 otherwise)
7372 0.159 0.365 0 1
Climate anomalies
Rain anomalies Rain anomalies 12 months before 
the survey month
7382 -0.108 0.209 -0.685 0.377
Temperature anomalies Temperature anomalies 12 months 
before the survey month




5068 0.151 0.358 0 1
Theft Theft of money, goods or crops 4787 0.058 0.234 0 1
 
Full sample
 Variable Variable description  Obs* Mean  SD  Min  Max
Age Age of the household head 12140 50.751 14.336 14 120
Sex Gender of the household head (1=Male; 
0=Female)
12140 0.951 0.217 0 1
Household size Number of household members 12140 10.776 7.644 1 84
Literacy Household head able to read (1=Yes: 0= no) 12140 0.335 0.472 0 1
Marital status Marital status (1=Yes: 0= no) 12140 0.934 0.248 0 1
Land size Land size (ha) 12140 6.029 15.371 0 432.245
Crop harvest Total amount of crops harvested (kgs) 12140 10.656 234.304 0 16010.2
Non-farm 
income
Total non-farm income per year (in USD) 12140 301.546 1951.085 0 131200
Electricity Household connected to electricity (1=Yes: 
0= no)
12140 0.228 0.420 0 1
Number of 
rooms
Number of rooms occupied 12140 5.409 4.286 1 40
Cereal donation Household benefited from cereal 
donation
7599 0.135 0.342 0 1
Own livestock Household owns livestock (1=Yes: 0= no) 12140 0.649 0.477 0 1
Rural-urban Rural-urban (1=rural; 0=urban) 12140 0.763 0.425 0 1
Table 1. Food insecurity, climate anomalies and conflict
Table 2. Household characteristics 
SD = standard deviation
*The difference in the sample sizes is because not all respondents responded to all questions.
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Overall, the results show a mixed correlation between skipping meals, reducing quantities of food 
consumed and temperature anomalies occurred 12 months before the survey month. Specifically, 
there exists a positive correlation between; rainfall anomalies and food insecurity whereas a negative 
correlation is observed with temperature anomalies. Moreover, the results of correlations between 
food insecurity (skipping of meals and reducing quantities) and conflict (violence and theft) are 
positive suggesting that increasing food insecurity is correlated with higher conflict occurrence. The 
correlation between rain anomalies and agricultural production is positive while the correlation with 
temperature anomalies is negative, this suggest that increase in rainfall anomalies may increase 
agricultural production while increase in temperature anomalies reduce agricultural production. 
Correlation between conflict (violence and theft) and agricultural production generally shows a 
negative association indicating that increase in agricultural production reduces the conflict. Finally, 
the results of the correlation between climate anomalies (rainfall and temperature anomalies in the 
12 months before the survey month) and conflict show mixed results. On the one hand, correlations 
between rainfall anomalies with conflict and theft are positive, suggesting that increasing rainfall 
anomalies increases the occurrence of conflict and theft. On the other hand, results of the analysis 
between temperature anomalies and violence and theft show a negative correlation. This suggests 
that an increase in temperature anomalies reduces the occurrence of violence and theft.
In sum, there seems to be an indication that generally climate anomalies increase food insecurity which 
in turn increases conflict occurrence. However, the mixed findings and the fact that the correlation 
values are small warrants further investigation through econometrics analysis controlling for several 
covariates. Additionally, we caution that the correlation performed assumes a linear relationship, yet, 
this may not be the case, there is a need to model the relationships through econometrics techniques. 
For brevity, we only present the results of the variables of interest. The estimation results are presented 




















Reduced food quantities 
consumed
0.779 1
Crop harvest 0.067 0.048 1
Rain anomalies 12 months 
before 
0.022 0.031 0.126 1
Temperature anomalies  
12 months before 
-0.080 -0.083 -0.016 0.345 1
Violence 0.126 0.135 -0.039 0.001 -0.103 1
Theft 0.047 0.039 -0.039 0.006 -0.020 0.269 1
Table 3. Correlation between climate anomalies, agricultural production, food insecurity 
and conflict 
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Table 4. The impact of climate on agricultural production (step 1) and the impact of 
climate and agricultural production on food insecurity (step 2)  
Step 1 OLS Step 2 Probit models
(1)




Reduced quantity of food 
consumed
Variables dy/dx Robust SE dy/dx Robust SE dy/dx Robust SE
anom_tmax_12 -1.992*** 0.548 -0.164** 0.336 -0.129* 0.309
anom_rain_12 0.562 0.415 -0.061 0.226 -0.010 0.214
Log total 
harvest








- - -0.015 0.044 -0.012 0.040
Year FE YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES
Observations 7,599 7,061 7,256
R-squared 0.682
1. Does climate influence agricultural production?
The results (Table 4 column (1)) show that increase in past temperature anomalies (12 months) by 1 
unit reduces the agricultural production measured by the quantity of crops harvested (in kgs) by 199.2 
kgs. This suggests that everything else held constant, increase in temperature anomalies reduces 
agricultural production. We do not find a significant relationship between rainfall anomalies and 
agricultural production. 
2. Does agricultural production, as affected by climate, influence household food 
security?
The Probit model results (marginal effects) in Table 4 columns (2) and (3) specifically for the agricultural 
production (log total harvest) though not significant, indicate that increase in agricultural production 
by 1 kg reduce the probability that household will skip meals by 1 percentage point and similarly 
reduce the probability that households will reduce quantities of food consumed by 0.4 percentage 
points. This is consistent with the recent findings by Giannini et al. (2017) who found that with 
reduced agricultural production resulting from climate risks in Mali, households rely more frequently 
on detrimental nutrition-based coping strategies, such as reducing the quantity or quality of meals. 
Turning to climate anomalies, we find that surprisingly, temperature anomalies significantly reduce 
both the probability that households will skip meals by 16.6 percentage points and the probability 
that they will reduce the quantities of food consumed by 12.9 percentage points. This unexpected 
finding deserves further investigation in the context of Mali. It may be the case that in Mali, an 
increase in temperature relative to the normal temperature result in households receiving food 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at household level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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support from support programs. It could also be the case that increase in temperature relative to the 
normal temperature do not directly affect food security status, but only through affecting agricultural 
production; this argument is consistent with step 1 findings that temperature anomalies reduce 
agricultural production. When we consider total crop harvest with the interactions with rainfall 
anomalies though not significant, it suggests that it reduces the probability that household will skip 
meals by 1.5 percentage points and also reduces the probability that it reduces the quantities of food 
consumed by 1.2 percentage points. This is plausible since increase in rainfall anomalies relative to 
other factors held constant, may increase agricultural production and thus leading to an increase in 
household food availability, access and affordability. On the other hand, again though not significant, 
the interaction between total crop harvest and temperature anomalies suggest that it increases the 
probability that the household will skip meals by 0.1 percentage points and also reduce the quantities 
of food consumed by 0.1 percentage points. This is consistent with step 1 findings that temperature 
anomalies reduce the agricultural production.
3. Does food insecurity, as exacerbated by climate impacts, affect the likelihood and 
intensity of conflict?
In step 3 we test the relationship between climate anomalies and conflict (violence and theft). We 
do this by estimating a set of probit models while controlling for household level characteristics. 
Additionally, we include year and location (cercle) fixed effects in the models. Two types of probit 
regression are estimated, (a) the effects of climate anomalies and food insecurity independently 
on conflict, and (b) the effect of climate anomalies and food insecurity independently and with the 
interaction between climate anomalies and food insecurity on conflict. The estimation results are 
shown in Table 5.  
The results in Table 5 first show that an increase in rain anomalies (increase in wet periods) significantly 
reduce the conflicts, this is consistent with the findings of Maystadt and Ecker (2014). The nonsignificant 
effect of temperature anomalies indicate that considered independently temperature anomalies do 
not directly influence occurrence of conflict. Relating to food insecurity, the findings indicate that 
skipping meals directly increase the chances of violent events occurring by 8.1 percentage points as 
shown in Table 5 column 1. When skipping meals is interacted with temperature anomalies, there 
is a higher probability about 17.8 percentage points of violent events occurring as shown in Table 
5 column 2. This indicate that temperature anomalies influence conflict through increasing food 
insecurity, which further support our argument that climate does not directly influence conflict. 
Regarding theft as a proxy of insecurity, the results in Table 5 column 3 indicate that when only 
skipping meals is considered (without interaction), the probability of theft occurring increases by 
4.5 percentage points. When skipping meals is interacted with temperature anomalies, there is a 
higher probability of about 15.5 percentage points that theft will occur (Table 5 column (4)). This could 
suggest that climate is an insecurity multiplier. 
In Table 6 the results of the effect of reduction in quantities of food consumed is presented. The 
results indicate that climate anomalies are consistent as explained above in Table 5. With regard to 
reducing the quantity of food consumed (food insecurity), the findings show that without interaction 
with climate anomalies, a reduction in quantities of food consumed by 1 unit increases the chances of 
violent events by 8.3 percentage points (Table 6 column (1)). 
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 dy/dx Robust 
SE
 dy/dx Robust 
SE
anom_tmax_12 -0.051 0.464 -0.074 0.474 -0.036 0.825 -0.046 0.824
anom_rain_12 -0.213*** 0.300 -0.180*** 0.332 - -0.161*** 0.395 -0.140*** 0.416
skip_meal 0.081*** 0.103 0.056 ** 0.141 0.045** 0.184 0.033 0.223
skip_meal_x_
temp12
- - 0.178 ** 0.485 - - 0.155 *** 0.557
skip_meal_x_
rain12
- - -0.146 0.534 - - -0.039 0.565
Log total 
harvest
-0.004* 0.015 -0.146** 0.015 -0.002 0.021 -0.002 0.020
Year FE YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,431 4,431 4,457 4,457
Robust SE = Robust standard errors clustered at household level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When reduction in quantities of food consumed is interacted with temperature anomalies, there is 
a higher probability of violent events occurring by about 18.8 percentage points (Table 6 column (2)). 
The interaction between reduction in quantities of food consumed with rainfall anomalies indicate 
that there is a probability of reduction in violent events by 15.7 percentage point (Table 6 column (2)). 
This may be because increase in wet seasons relative to normal months may increase food production 
other things remaining constant, which increases food availability, access and affordability and this in 
turn may reduce the incentive to engage in conflict activities.
With respect to theft, results in Table 6 column (3)) indicate that when the reduction in quantities of 
food consumed is considered independently, the probability that theft will occur increase by about 
3.7 percentage points. On the other hand, when the reduction in quantities of food consumed is 
interacted with temperature anomalies, there is a higher probability of theft events occurring at 
about 16.8 percentage points (Table 6 column (4)). This finding further augments our proposition that 
climate is a threat multiplier.
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that in general if we consider temperature anomalies 
only, the effect on conflict is negative suggesting that temperature anomalies exclusively do not 
increase the probability of conflict occurrence. However, interacting temperature anomalies and 
food insecurity (both skipping meals and reducing the quantities of food consumed) indicate that 
interaction particularly increases the probability of conflict occurrence (both violence and theft). This 
is evidence that the relationship between climate and conflict may be indirect and complex and may 
depend on contextual factors.
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Table 6. Estimation results of step 3 on the effect of reducing the quantity of food 














 dy/dx Robust 
SE
 dy/dx Robust 
SE
anom_tmax_12 -0.046 0.471 -0.085 0.492 -0.040 0.817 -0.057 0.819
anom_rain_12 -0.219*** 0.299 -0.177*** 0.340 -0.164*** 0.393 -0.140*** 0.412
reduced_qnty 0.083*** 0.091 -0.053 *** 0.126 0.037** 0.167 0.019 0.214
reduced_
qnty_x_temp12
- - 0.188 *** 0.461 - - 0.168*** 0.586
reduced_
qnty_x_rain12
- - -0.157** 0.494 - - -0.051 0.537
Log total 
harvest
-0.005** 0.014 -0.005** 0.014 -0.017 0.002 -0.002 0.020
Year FE YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,430 4,430 4,454 4,454
Robust SE = Robust standard errors clustered at household level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. CONCLUSIONS
Our findings reveal that climate change is a threat multiplier, this is consistent with previous studies 
that have found that climate change indirectly leads to increased conflict occurrence (Crost et al. 2018; 
Fjelde 2015; Mach et al. 2019). We have shown that food insecurity is the mechanism through which 
climate change influences conflict. In other words, climate change indirectly exacerbates conflict by 
adversely affecting agricultural production and food security.
While we have shown that climate change affects conflict through increasing food insecurity, we have 
modelled the relationships independently. However, we have taken into account the interactions 
between climate anomalies and food insecurity to minimize the assumption that the relationships are 
independent. We note however that the interaction may not completely overcome the assumption 
of independence, thus we suggest that future studies need to consider econometric techniques that 
consider these complex relationships. 
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